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THE EFFECT OF MUSIC ON SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION IN 
ADOLESCENTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS
Anjali K. Bhatara,1 Eve-Marie Quintin,2 Pamela Heaton,3 
Eric Fombonne,1,4 and Daniel J. Levitin1
1McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada,
3Goldsmiths College, University of London, United Kingdom,  and  4Department
of Psychiatry, Montreal Children’s Hospital, Montreal, Canada
High-functioning adolescents with ASD and matched controls were presented with anima-
tions that depicted varying levels of social interaction and were either accompanied by
music or silent. Participants described the events of the animation, and we scored responses
for intentionality, appropriateness, and length of description. Adolescents with ASD were
less likely to make social attributions, especially for those animations with the most complex
social interactions. When stimuli were accompanied by music, both groups were equally
impaired in appropriateness and intentionality. We conclude that adolescents with ASD
perceive and integrate musical soundtracks with visual displays equivalent to typically
developing individuals.
Keywords: Autism; Music; Social attribution; Pervasive developmental disorders;
Asperger syndrome.
Among typical adults, it is well established that the presence of music (a “musical
soundtrack”) can influence the emotional impact of a visual scene or video game (Cohen,
2001; Lipscomb & Zehnder, 2004) and even alter perception and later memory of events
in a visual scene (Boltz, 2001, 2004; Boltz, Schulkind, & Kantra, 1991). There is less
evidence of this effect in children, but children’s interpretations of stories do vary accord-
ing to the emotional valence of background music presented with the story (Ziv &
Goshen, 2006). To date, no research has addressed the question of how musical
soundtracks influence perception and cognition in individuals with Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASD). These disorders are characterized by abnormalities in social cognition.
The main goal of the present study was therefore to determine whether the presence of a
musical soundtrack affects social cognition differentially in children with ASD and typi-
cally developing controls. If true, it would indicate that children with ASD are either
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2 A. K. BHATARA ET AL.
processing the music differently or integrating the music with the animation in different
ways from the controls. If, however, the music affects the two groups in the same way,
then these findings could be taken as additional evidence for music as a spared domain of
cognitive processing in ASD.
Autism is a heterogeneous neurodevelopmental disorder defined by behavioral
characteristics (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition,
text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). There are three
definitional criteria: deficits in social behavior, impaired communication abilities, and a
restricted range of interests. In order to be diagnosed with classic autism, the patient must
fulfill all three criteria outlined above. Often, he or she will show language delay. If the
patient shows deficits in social behavior, has a restricted range of interest and has a high
enough IQ and no language delay, he or she may be diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. If
only some of the three criteria are fulfilled, and the patient does not fit the criteria for
Asperger syndrome, a clinician may diagnose him or her with pervasive developmental
disorder – not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). All of these disorders are part of the
autism spectrum, with large variation in the severity of symptoms (Wing, 1997; Wing &
Gould, 1979). Current estimates of the prevalence of ASD in the population suggest that
between 6 and 7 out of 1,000 individuals are affected with an ASD, with the highest pro-
portion of these being classified as PDD-NOS (Fombonne, 2005; Fombonne, Zakarian,
Bennett, Meng, & McLean-Heywood, 2006). Because of the heterogeneity of ASD and
the relative neglect of individuals with PDD-NOS in research studies, our study was not
focused solely on investigating classic autism but was broadened to include children and
adolescents spanning the entire spectrum of autism, Asperger syndrome, and PDD-NOS.
While individuals with classic autism, Asperger syndrome, and PDD-NOS meet
slightly different criteria according to DSM-IV, they share several common elements.
Difficulties in three areas are broadly associated with the autism spectrum: the ability to
predict or interpret others’ thoughts, moods, and actions (Leslie, 1987); social cognition
(defined as the ability to select, to interpret, and to use social information to make judg-
ments and decisions; Taylor, 1997); and the ability to interpret affective cues of differing
complexity (Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1989).
Among typically developing children and adults, there is generally strong agreement
as to which of the basic emotions is portrayed by a given piece of music (Cross, in press),
both within and across cultures (Balkwill, Thompson, & Matsunaga, 2004). Note, how-
ever, that data from a study carried out with children and musically naïve adults showed
considerably less consensus about the meaning of complex emotions in music such as tri-
umph and contemplation (Heaton, Allen, Williams, Cummins, & Happé, 2008). None-
theless, this is still a useful approach for examining social cognition of children with ASD.
In this method, researchers ask children with ASD to identify pictorially represented
emotions and mental states by pairing them with extracts of music depicting these mental
states and emotions. In the first of these studies, Heaton et al. (1999) showed that children
with autism were unimpaired in recognizing two basic emotions (happiness and sadness)
when they were associated with music in major and minor modes. In a second study,
Heaton et al. (2008) extended this paradigm to include measures of more complex
emotions and mental states (fear, anger, tenderness, triumph, and contemplation). They
tested a large sample of typically developing 4- to 10-year-old children and found that
chronological age accounted for most of the variance in performance. When intellectually
high- and low-functioning children and adolescents with autism, and adolescents and
young adults with Down syndrome completed the same task, there was no significant
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MUSIC AND SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION 3
effect of diagnosis once verbal mental age was factored out of the analysis. This suggests
that children with autism who achieved sufficient verbal mental age scores showed no def-
icits in understanding and categorizing the stimuli. An important question arising from the
findings of emotion recognition in music is whether such abilities may be used to increase
the poor levels of social understanding characteristic of this disorder.
An influential theoretical account of the typical deficits in social cognition that
characterizes ASD is that individuals with ASD are impaired in “Theory of Mind” (ToM;
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), the ability of individuals to connect others’ observ-
able behaviors with their internal mental states (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999) in order to
predict their behavior. The ability to understand others’ beliefs and intentions is often
tested using False Belief tasks (for a review and meta-analysis of these, see Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Research has shown that typically developing children pass these
tests by age 4 or 5 (Sabbagh, Moses, & Shiverick, 2006), but children with autism fre-
quently do not pass these tests (see Baron-Cohen, 2001, for a review). There is evidence
that those who do pass use strategies that differ from those used by typically developing
(TD) children (Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005). However, the extent to which ToM tasks
predict or reflect functioning outside of the experimental setting has become a matter of
considerable debate. Klin, for example (2000), presented data from a sample of intellectu-
ally unimpaired individuals with autism or Asperger syndrome. Most of these individuals
possessed sufficient language skills to be able to pass False Belief tasks in the lab but were
highly impaired in interpersonal relationships as measured by the Vineland Adaptive
Behavior Scales (Sparrow, Balla, & Dicchetti, 1984). This finding is consistent with
numerous other studies showing that success on False Belief tasks does not preclude
characteristic deficits in social interactions in autism (e.g., Bauminger & Kasari, 1999;
Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). Klin points out that these laboratory tasks do not measure spon-
taneous seeking of social information in the environment, the ability to distinguish impor-
tant from irrelevant social information, or the ability to integrate environmental
information into a social context. This suggests that the construct tested in most ToM tasks
is only one of many social cognitive mechanisms, any of which can impair functioning in
the real world. For example, one mechanism of interest is the ability to attribute social
intention to animated figures.
Klin (2000) and Bowler and Thommen (2000) adapted Heider and Simmel’s
(1944) animation of geometric figures to examine the ability of children and young
adults with ASD to understand nonverbal social communication and to attribute social
intentions and actions to the moving figures. Klin found that while the control group
reacted to the animations much like Heider and Simmel’s (1944) adult participants, the
young adults in the ASD group failed to identify many of the social elements of the story
and made fewer relevant social attributions. Bowler and Thommen found that children
with autism described fewer interactions between the figures when compared with chro-
nological-age- and IQ-matched typical control groups, and they also involved themselves
more in their descriptions of the animation than the children without autism (e.g., “I’m
going to catch that grey . . .”).
Abell, Happé, and Frith (2000) also used this paradigm with high-functioning
children with ASD, but rather than using Heider and Simmel’s (1944) animation, which
mainly portrayed goal-directed action rather than mental-state attribution, Abell et al.
developed several shorter animated cartoons with only two figures interacting. They cre-
ated three categories of interaction: Random (Rnd), Goal-directed (GD), and Theory of
Mind (ToM). In the random animations, two triangles moved in random fashion and did
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4 A. K. BHATARA ET AL.
not affect each other’s movement. In the GD animations, the two triangles appeared to
respond to each other’s behavior thereby demonstrating intentionality. However, their
putative intentions were to perform physical actions (e.g., chasing, leading, fighting) and
so did not involve “mind-reading.” In the ToM animations, the two triangles interacted in
more complex ways, with one triangle demonstrating an intention to influence the other
triangle’s mental state (e.g., coaxing, mocking, surprising).
After viewing each animation, the participants were asked to describe what they saw
happening in the animation. These responses were rated on two dimensions: overall accu-
racy and type of description. Accuracy was rated by comparing the participant’s descrip-
tion with the animation designer’s intended meaning. There were three categories for
types of description: whether they described simple actions, interaction without mental
state terms (interaction), or interactions with mental-state terms (mentalizing). The
authors found that there was a trend toward a group difference among the autism and
control groups, with the autism group being less accurate overall. In addition, fewer
participants in the autism group achieved perfect scores on at least two of the four ToM
animations than the other groups. There were no differences between groups for Rnd and
GD. It was also noted that the autism group used significantly fewer appropriate mentaliz-
ing descriptions for the ToM animations than the control group. The most salient finding
from the study was the difference in levels of appropriateness of mentalizing descriptions
between groups.
Castelli, Frith, Happé, and Frith (2002) used these same animations in a neuroim-
aging study of adults with and without autism or Asperger syndrome to examine the
neural bases of these types of social attribution. They found similar behavioral results to
Abell et al. (2000), with the autism group giving less accurate descriptions and fewer
mental-state descriptions of the ToM animations, but not varying from the control group
on GD or Rnd animations. Thus, deficits observed in this study were specific to the ToM
animations.
Findings from experiments testing social cognition using music (Heaton et al., 1999,
2008) suggest that music provides emotional and mental-state cues that children with
autism can understand. In addition, experiments adding music to films (Boltz, 2001, 2004)
or Heider and Simmel’s (1944) animation (used by Marshall & Cohen, 1988) have shown
that typical adults’ perception of events in the sequence changes in a specific way as a
result of the music. In order to investigate these phenomena in individuals with ASD, we
added musical soundtracks to animations developed and used by Abell et al. (2000) and
Castelli et al. (2002) and presented both these and silent versions to adolescents with and
without ASD and a control group of age- and IQ-matched typically developing adoles-
cents. We compared the results from the ASD group to those from the control group, and
we also examined results from diagnostic subgroups within the ASD group (PDD-NOS
vs. Asperger syndrome).
In the present experiment, the presence of music with the animations is predicted to
modify the typically developing (TD) control group’s interpretation of the events. The
rationale for this prediction draws on studies by Boltz (2001, 2004) and Cohen (2001)
showing modification of interpretation of visual scenes in response to music. Further,
because of music’s emotional force, we predict that the descriptions of those animations
with the greatest social attribution component will be most influenced by the presence of
music, that is, the ToM cartoons followed by the GD cartoons.
With respect to diagnosis, our primary hypothesis (H1) is that deficits in social attri-
bution are robust and cannot be influenced by the addition of music. The alternative
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MUSIC AND SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION 5
hypothesis (H2) is that while individuals with ASD will be impaired in social attribution
relative to matched controls, such deficits may nevertheless show a shift in responses
when music is added to the animations. This is because social communicative deficits fall
on a continuum in ASD, and empirical data suggest some degree of sparing of perception
of emotions and mental states in music (Heaton et al., 1999, 2008). If our findings show
that ASD participants’ descriptions are influenced by the addition of musical soundtracks
differently from those of controls (as measured by appropriateness or number of intention-
ality words), then this would be evidence that individuals with ASD are perceiving the
music or the combination of the music and cartoon in a different way from controls.
METHOD
Participants
There were two experimental groups in this study. Initially, 33 children with Autism
Spectrum Disorders (ASD) were recruited: 25 from a specialized autism clinic at the
Montreal Children’s Hospital and 8 from a private school for children with physical and
mental disabilities. These participants were aged between 10 and 19 years and had all been
diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria by specialized medical teams with expertise in
diagnosing autism and other ASDs. Subgroup diagnosis (Asperger syndrome and PDD-
NOS) was done according to DSM-IV criteria. Forty-six typically developing children
between the ages of 8 and 18 were recruited by word of mouth and from four public
schools in Montreal.
For the study’s analyses, 26 participants in the TD group (14 girls and 12 boys) were
matched to a group of 26 participants with ASD (3 with Autism, 13 with Asperger
syndrome, and 10 with PDD-NOS; 6 girls and 20 boys) such that verbal IQ (VIQ), perfor-
mance IQ (PIQ) and full scale IQ (FSIQ) scores from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence differed by less than one standard deviation (see below for descriptions of
screening instruments; see Table 1 for results). The t-tests on chronological age and PIQ
showed no difference between groups, tage(50) = 0.15, p = .89, and tPIQ(50) = 1.59, p = .12.
Independent sample t-tests showed no difference between groups on years of musical
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Participants with ASD (N = 26) and Typically Developing (TD)
(N = 26) Participants
Age (yr:mo) FSIQ VIQ PIQ
ASD
(6 girls, 20 boys)
Mean 13:7 97 94 101
SD 1:11 15 19 13
Range 10:10–19:4 79–133 62–132 81–129
TD
(14 girls, 12 boys)
Mean 13:6 108 107 107
SD 2:2 12 13 15
Range 9:11–17:9 79–132 81–133 75–137
t(50) 0.15 2.76** 2.91** 1.59
FSIQ: Full scale IQ, VIQ: verbal IQ, PIQ: performance IQ.
**p < .01.
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6 A. K. BHATARA ET AL.
training, tyrs(48) = −0.86, p = .40, number of instruments played, tinst(50) = −1.55, p = .13,
or scaled scores for digit span or letter-number sequencing, tDS(50) = 0.32, p = .75, and
tLN(50) = 1.38, p = .17.
Background and Screening Measures
All participants completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI).
As the experiment described below has considerable auditory-temporal demands, we also
evaluated the participants on their auditory working memory with the Digit Span and Let-
ter-Number Sequencing subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-IV
(WISC-IV). Musical experience was measured by participants’ responses on a revised
version of the Queens Questionnaire for Musical Background (Cuddy, Balkwill, Peretz, &
Holden, 2005) and the parents’ responses on the Salk and McGill Music Inventory
(SAMMI; Levitin, Cole, Chiles, Lai, Lincoln, & Bellugi, 2004). The parents of the partic-
ipants also completed two questionnaires about social functioning: the Social Communi-
cation Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) and the Social Responsiveness
Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003). These latter two instruments provided us with a way
to screen our control participants for signs of autism (see Table 2). No participants in the
TD group met the cutoff for ASD on the SCQ.
The parents of three of the participants in the ASD group reported on the SAMMI
questionnaire that their child had hearing-related problems in early childhood, but that
these problems were no longer present at the time of testing. One additional child reported
impairment in one ear but was included in the study given that one ear with normal hearing
is sufficient to complete the task. No hearing problems were reported for the TD group.
Stimuli
Stimuli were based on a paradigm initially developed by Heider and Simmel (1944).
The animations used in the present study were those developed by Abell et al. (2000), as
described above. These animations showed two triangles moving around the screen in one
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Participants with ASD (N = 26) and Typically Developing (TD) (N = 26)
Participants
Number of 
Instruments played
Years of musical 
 experience (yr: mo) SRS SCQ
ASD
(6 girls, 20 boys)
Mean 1 2:2 75 18
SD 0.8 3:3 14 14
Range 0–3 0–12 43–90 1–29
TD
(14 girls, 12 boys)
Mean 1 2:11 49 4
SD 1.1 3:1 9 9
Range 0–4 0–11 36–73 0–13
t(50) −1.55 −0.86 8.16** 9.4**
SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale, SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire.
**p < .01.
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MUSIC AND SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION 7
of three different ways, which were described by Abell et al. as Random (Rnd; e.g., bounc-
ing), Goal-directed (GD; e.g., fighting), or Theory of Mind sequences (ToM; e.g., mock-
ing). We selected a subset of each of these three types of animations and added a unique
musical soundtrack to each animation, thus creating two conditions, visual only (the origi-
nal animations) and auditory-visual combined (with our added musical soundtracks).
Our original goal was to create one version with music that “matched” the animation
well and one version that was not well matched. Thus, we initially created two musical
versions of each of the 11 animations used in the Abell et al. (2000) study, resulting in a
total of 22 musically accompanied animations. Sixteen adults were asked to rate each ani-
mation on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being “music matches well” and 1 being “music does
not match.” The pilot study revealed poor consensus and it appeared that, in many cases,
either type of music could be perceived as well matched. Given that the geometric figures
were relatively abstract, with no faces or bodies to communicate expression, the moods of
the scenes themselves were more ambiguous than scenes with people acting or speaking.
Therefore, there was much less of a visual scene for the music to match, so it is not sur-
prising that the music showed no strong consensus.
Because of this lack of consensus, we included only one musical version for each
animation—the one that obtained the higher matching rating. However, for two anima-
tions, one GD (Leading) and one ToM (Mocking), we included both musical versions
because there was a significant difference in the ratings between the two different types of
music, tLeading(15)  = 2.57, p = .02 and tMocking(15) = 3.14, p = .007. In order to keep the
experiment to a manageable length of time, one animation from each category (Rnd, GD,
and ToM) was eliminated. The criteria for this were redundancy (chasing being similar to
leading, so we eliminated the former; all three random animations elicited similar
responses) or lack of matching (neither musical selection we chose was rated as matching
well with the coaxing animation).
This resulted in a total of 8 silent animations (2 Random, 3 Goal-Directed, and
3 Theory of Mind) and 10 music animations (2 Random, 4 Goal-Directed, and 4 Theory of
Mind) with Leading and Mocking each paired with two different musical excerpts (for a list
of these, see Appendix A. Stimuli are available online at http://www.psych.mcgill.ca/labs/
levitin/triangles.htm). These were presented according to the procedure outlined below.
Procedure
Participants saw all versions of the animations in two blocks. Block one consisted of
the 8 silent animations and block two consisted of the 10 animations that were accompa-
nied by music. The order of presentation of blocks was counterbalanced, and the anima-
tions were presented in random order within the blocks.
Auditory stimuli were presented through loudspeakers (Acoustic Research, Model
570, Hauppauge, New York). The experiment was presented in Psiexp (Smith, 1995) on
a Macintosh Powerbook. After each animation, participants rated how well they thought
the music matched the animation on a slider scale on the computer screen. The left and
right ends of the slider scale were labeled “Does not match at all” and “Matches very
well,” respectively. There were no numbers on the scale, but there were four tick marks
along the edge of the scale so participants could better keep track of their own ratings.
In addition, participants answered the question: “What do you think was happening in
the cartoon?” Their responses were recorded using a Sony PCM-M1 portable DAT
recorder and then transcribed. They were then coded by two independent raters using
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8 A. K. BHATARA ET AL.
criteria modified from Castelli, Happé, Frith, and Frith (2000, received from F. Castelli,
personal communication, June 15, 2006).
The independent variable was Diagnosis (ASD versus typically developing). The
four dependent variables were Music Matching (how well the music matched the cartoon),
Length of Description, Appropriateness of Description, and Presence of Intentionality.
The Length score was determined by the number of clauses from 0 to 5, with 0 being no
response and 5 being five or more clauses. The Appropriateness score reflects how accu-
rately the participant’s description of the event depicted in the animation matched the
original intent of the designers of the animation. This was scored from 0 to 3, with 0 repre-
senting an “I don’t know” response and 3 representing an accurate and complete descrip-
tion. The Intentionality score reflected the degree to which the participant described
complex, intentional mental states and was scored on a scale of 0 to 5 with 0 representing
no purposeful action and 5 representing intentional manipulation of the mental state of
another (See Appendix B). As measured by two-way mixed-model intraclass correlation
(ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979), interrater agreement for all categories was high, with all
three ICCs ≥ 0.89 (p < .001).
RESULTS
Music Matching
We performed a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the Music Matching ratings
with diagnosis as a between-subjects factor and animation type as a within-subject factor. We
found that the diagnostic groups did not differ from each other in their ratings of how well the
music matched the animation, F(1, 50) = 0.18, p =  0.68, indicating that children with ASD did
not differ from typically developing controls in this measure. There were significant differ-
ences in music-matching ratings across the animation types, F(2, 100) = 10.47, p < .001.
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons among the animation types showed that all partici-
pants tended to rate the music excerpts as better matched with the Theory of Mind (ToM) anima-
tions than with the Goal-directed (GD), t(51) = −2.90, p < .01, and Random (Rnd), t(51) = −4.08,
p < .001, types of animations. The difference between GD and Rnd was marginally signifi-
cant, t(51) = −1.89, p = .06. There was no interaction between animation type and diagnosis.
In sum, the two groups did not differ from each other in music matching, and all participants
rated the music as better matched with the ToM animations than with the other two.
Length
We performed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA on length of description
scores, with diagnosis as a between-subject factor and music/silent and animation type as a
within-subject factor. The main effect of diagnosis was significant, F(1, 50) = 4.02, p < .05,
because the ASD group provided longer descriptions for all animations. The main effect of
animation type was also significant, F(2, 100) = 78.32, p < .001. Bonferroni-adjusted pair-
wise comparisons showed that all participants’ descriptions of the ToM animations were
longer than those of the GD, t(51) = −5.48, p < .001, and the descriptions of the GD anima-
tions were longer than the descriptions of the Rnd, t(51) = −5.75, p < .001. There was also a
trend toward an interaction between animation type and diagnosis, F(2,100) = 2.91, p = .06,
shown in Figure 1. While the control group showed a strong tendency to provide longer
descriptions of the ToM animations than of the other two, the ASD group tended to provide
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descriptions of similar length across animation types. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compar-
isons showed that the ASD group’s descriptions were significantly longer than the control
group’s for the Rnd animations, t(50) = 3.33, p = .002, and for the GD animations, t(50) =
4.92, p < .001, but did not differ significantly for the ToM animations, t(50) = 0.75, p = .46.
Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests showed that there was a significant difference between the
length of descriptions of the GD and ToM animations for the ASD group (p < .01), but the
descriptions of the Rnd and GD did not differ significantly in length. However, all three of
these animation types differed in length for the control group (p < .01).
There was also a significant main effect for the music/silent condition, F(1, 100) =
11.82, p = .001, with all participants producing longer responses to the silent animations
than to the animations with music.
In summary, all participants gave the longest descriptions for the ToM, next longest
for the GD, and the shortest descriptions for the Rnd animations; though the difference
between the GD and Rnd was not significant for the ASD group. The ASD group gave
longer descriptions than the control group for the Rnd and GD animations, but the groups
did not differ on the ToM animations. Also, all participants gave longer descriptions for
the silent animations than for those with music.
Appropriateness
We performed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA on the Appropriateness
scores with diagnosis as a between-subject factor and music/silent and animation type as
within-subject factors. The main effect of diagnosis was not significant, F(1, 50) = 2.3, p =
.14. The main effect of animation type was significant, F(1, 50) = 15.86, p < .001. Bonfer-
roni-adjusted t-tests (with an adjusted α of .01) showed that the ToM animations were
described less appropriately than the GD and the Rnd animations, t(51) = 4.35, p < .001
and t(51) = 5.21, p < .001, respectively. Also, the GD animations showed a trend toward
being described less appropriately than the Rnd animations, t(51) = 2.15, p = .04. In addi-
tion, the main effect of music/silent was significant, F(1, 50) = 14.94, p < .001. Animations with
music were described less appropriately than silent animations, and each of the participants’
Figure 1 Length of descriptions (mean number of clauses) of the ASD and TD groups for each animation type.
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appropriateness was affected by the music on at least one of the animations. There were no
significant interactions among the three factors. In summary, the analysis of the appropri-
ateness measure showed that both the presence of music and more complex animation
types caused all participants’ descriptions to become less appropriate.
Intentionality
We performed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA on Intentionality with diag-
nosis as a between-subject factor and music/silent and animation type as within-subject
factors. The main effects of diagnosis and music/silent were not significant, but the main
effect of animation type was significant, F(2, 100) = 136.6, p < .001. Bonferroni-adjusted
comparisons (with an adjusted α of .01) showed that the ToM animations’ descriptions
included more intentionality words than those of the GD animations, t(51) =  −9.58; p <
.001, and the GD animations’ descriptions included more intentionality words than those
of the Rnd animations, t(51) = −9.76, p < .001. There was a significant interaction between
animation type and diagnosis, F(2, 100) = 4.65, p = .01, which indicates that for the ToM
animations, as expected from our a priori hypothesis, the ASD group used fewer intention-
ality words than the control group, t(50) = −2.47, p = .02 (see Figure 2).
In addition, there was a significant two-way interaction between animation type and
music/silent, F(2, 100) = 5.55, p < .01. This interaction shows that the participants’
descriptions for the ToM animations contained words with less intentionality when there
was music present than when the animations were silent (see Figure 3).
To further explore the relationship between ASD symptom severity and our depen-
dent measures, we performed Pearson correlations between the SRS T-scores and the
dependent variables. When both groups were combined, we found a significant negative
correlation between SRS scores and intentionality scores for the ToM animations, r = −.34,
p = .01. However, when the diagnostic groups were analyzed separately, this correlation
was no longer significant.
Figure 2 Intentionality ratings of responses of the ASD and TD groups for each animation type.
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In summary, the two groups’ descriptions did not differ in intentionality for the Rnd
and GD animations, but the ASD group used words with less intentionality than the con-
trol group for the ToM animations. Intentionality scores also showed a relation to parental
report of social behavior, as measured by SRS scores. In addition, all participants’ descrip-
tions of the ToM animations contained less intentionality when there was music present.
Music did not affect the intentionality of the descriptions for the Rnd or GD animations.
Subgroups within the autism spectrum. Of the 26 participants in the ASD
group who were included in all previous analyses, there were 13 children who had been
diagnosed with Asperger syndrome (AS) and 10 children who had been diagnosed with
PDD-NOS (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics). The remaining three were diagnosed
with classical autism. Because this was such a small number, these three were excluded
Figure 3 Intentionality ratings of responses of all participants in the music and silent conditions for each
animation type.
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and t-tests for Participants with Asperger Syndrome and PDD-NOS
Age(yr:mo) FSIQ VIQ PIQ
Asperger syndrome (N = 13)
Mean 13:3 108 107 105
SD 1:9 14 15 14
Range 10:11–19:4 86–133 88–132 86–129
PDD-NOS (N = 10)
Mean 13:9 88 81 98
SD 1:6 6 10 8
Range 10:10–16:2 82–100 62–93 87–111
t(21) −.62 4.23** 4.91** 1.44
FSIQ: Full scale IQ, VIQ: verbal IQ, PIQ: performance IQ.
**p < .001.
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from the following analysis only. However, examination of the data from the three partic-
ipants with classical autism showed the appropriateness and intentionality of their
responses to be more similar to that of the PDD-NOS group than that of the AS group.
We compared the music matching, length, appropriateness, and intentionality results
from the AS group to those from the PDD-NOS group using repeated measures ANOVAs
with subgroup diagnosis and animation as factors for music matching and diagnosis, ani-
mation and music condition as factors for the other three variables. There were no signifi-
cant differences between subgroups in music matching or length.
For appropriateness, there was no main effect of subgroup F(1, 21) = 1.07, p = .31,
but there was a significant interaction between music condition and subgroup diagnosis,
F(1, 21) = 4.34, p < .05. This was due to a reduced appropriateness in the responses from
the PDD-NOS group for the silent animations, but no difference in appropriateness for the
animations with music.
For intentionality, again subgroup diagnosis was not a significant factor, F(1, 21) =
1.62, p = .22, but the interaction between diagnosis and music condition approached sig-
nificance, F(1, 21) = 3.03, p < .10 (failure to reach significance may be due to low
observed power; power = .30). As can be seen in Figure 4a, the TD, AS, and PDD-NOS
groups’ intentionality responses were similar to each other in the music condition but dif-
fered in the silent condition. While the group with PDD-NOS and the TD group showed
similar patterns, with their intentionality of response higher in the silent condition than in
the music condition, the group with AS showed the opposite pattern. Their intentionality
responses were higher for the animations with music than for the silent animations. In
addition, the three-way interaction among music condition, animation type, and diagnosis
approached significance, F(2, 42) = 3.09, p < .06, (observed power = .56). When the ani-
mation types were examined separately, the different patterns between the AS and PDD-
NOS group were only evident for the Rnd animations; the groups did not differ for the GD
or ToM animations (see Figure 4b).
Verbal IQ
Because verbal IQ was approximately one SD different between groups, we
explored its relationship with the dependent variables by using Pearson correlations. We
found that, of all the variables, VIQ was only significantly correlated with Appropriate-
ness on the Rnd animations, r = .32, p = .02. Thus, individuals with higher IQs gave
responses that were more appropriate for the Rnd animations. Because this variable
showed no main effect or interaction with the group variable, there were no group effects
that could be accounted for by VIQ differences. Intentionality was the only variable that
showed an impairment in the ASD group, so we further examined this using an ANCOVA
with VIQ as the covariate. VIQ did not show any significant between-subjects effects,
F(1, 49) = 0.023, p = .9, nor did it interact with the music/silent or animation factors (all p
values > .5). We conclude, therefore, that it is neither a significant factor in the general lin-
ear model nor is it a significant predictor.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of both the music and silent conditions yielded similar results to those
obtained by Castelli et al. (2002) and Abell et al. (2000). Both of these studies found differ-
ences between ASD and control groups in the appropriateness of mentalizing descriptions
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of ToM animations. We did not find a significant intergroup difference in appropriateness
of descriptions, but we did find that the ASD group used fewer “mentalizing” words in
their descriptions of the ToM animations than the control group did. The similarity of our
findings with these earlier studies validates our inclusion of younger (adolescents rather
than adults) participants, drawn from the broader autism spectrum (PDD-NOS).
Figure 4 (a) Intentionality ratings by each diagnostic subgroup for the music and silent conditions, collapsed
across animation type and (b) intentionality ratings by each diagnostic subgroup for the music and silent condi-
tions for only the random animations.
Intentionality by Music condition and Diagnosis
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
Intentionality ratings for Random Animations Only
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Silent Music
Music condition
Silent
(A)
(B)
Music
Music condition
Typically
Developing
Asperger
PDD-NOS
Typically
Developing
Asperger
PDD-NOS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Le
vi
ti
n,
 D
an
ie
l 
J.
][
Ca
na
di
an
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
Kn
ow
le
dg
e 
Ne
tw
or
k]
 A
t:
 0
6:
31
 1
3 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
14 A. K. BHATARA ET AL.
There is evidence that individuals with ASD are impaired in integrating auditory and
visual information at higher levels of processing, including processing of linguistic informa-
tion (Bebko, Weiss, Demark, & Gomez, 2006; O’Connor, 2007; Smith & Bennetto, 2007).
This is relevant in the current context as the task depended, in part, on intact integration of
higher level auditory and visual stimuli. Specifically, we found that the responses from the
participants with ASD to the question “How well does the music match?” did not differ from
those of controls. While previous findings have shown that children with ASD are unim-
paired in matching music to static representations (line drawings) of mental states and emo-
tions (Heaton et al., 1999, 2008), this is the first study to show that they do not differ from
controls in rating how well music matches a moving picture. Like the controls, the children
with ASD gave higher ratings to the animations with more social complexity, possibly
because these contained more visual information with which to match the music. In addition,
this suggests that all participants were successful at some level in integrating the auditory
input of the music with the visual input from the animations. This finding is not consistent
with evidence showing difficulties in integrating information across modalities in autism
(Bebko et al., 2006; Iarocci & McDonald, 2006; O’Connor, 2007; Smith & Bennetto, 2007);
although face/voice integration may rely on different neural mechanisms to animation/music
associations, and face/voice integration clearly makes higher social cognitive demands.
In order to provide a clearer interpretation of the findings, the results that were not
affected by the presence of music will be discussed first. The results from the length mea-
sure show that that all participants gave longer descriptions to the ToM animations than to
the other two types of animations. This replicates the Castelli et al. (2000) findings with
healthy adults and can be attributed to the increased complexity of the ToM animations
relative to GD and Rnd. The results from the appropriateness measures showed that all
participants described the ToM animations less appropriately than they described the GD
and Rnd animations, that is, their descriptions of the animations were less well matched
with what the animation designers intended. As with the increased length of descriptions
for the ToM animations, this may be due to the increased complexity of the interactions
depicted in the ToM animations. All participants included more intentionality words in
their descriptions for the ToM animations than for the GD, and more for the GD than for
the Rnd. This is an expected result, as by design ToM animations included higher levels of
intentionality (meaning the shapes showed more purposeful movement) than the GD, and
the GD included higher levels of intentionality than the Rnd.
The children in the ASD group did not differ from controls in the length of utter-
ances in response to the ToM animations. However, the overall length of utterance for the
ASD group collapsed across conditions was longer. This reflects smaller differences
across animation types as well as higher length of utterance scores than controls for the
Rnd and GD animations. This finding, showing that ASD children did not show selective
increases in length of descriptions in response to the ToM animations relative to the other
two types may reflect the reduced salience of more “social” interactions.
The results from the appropriateness measure showed that the children with ASD
did not differ from the control group.
On the intentionality measure, the significant interaction between diagnosis and ani-
mation revealed that the control group’s descriptions contained more intentionality words
than the ASD group’s for the ToM animations, and this was negatively correlated with
SRS scores across groups. Thus, the lower an individual’s score on the SRS (indicating a
greater amount of social responsiveness) the more intentionality in his or her responses for
the ToM animations.
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In summary, the results of the present study have replicated the main findings of
previous studies with the exception of the appropriateness measure. Previous studies have
shown participants with ASD to be impaired in appropriateness of description relative to
the TD group, but the present study found no difference.
The Effect of Music
On average, all participants’ descriptions of animations with music were less appro-
priate than their descriptions of the silent animations. This suggests that the music pro-
vided a conflicting source of information and in many cases altered the participants’
perception of the visual events. Indeed, it was noted that all participants exhibited a
change in appropriateness as a result of music on at least one of the eight animations, con-
firming that the music modified the participants’ perception of the events in the animation.
In addition, all participants’ ToM descriptions were decreased in intentionality by
the addition of the music. This could be due to the music being a conflicting information
source (providing alternate emotional interpretation of the events of the animations) or
being a simple distraction. Below are two examples of participants’ descriptions of the
same animations (“Mocking”) with and without music. In this animation, the blue triangle
is following the red triangle and imitating it without the red triangle noticing until the end.
See Appendix B for more specifics on scoring.
TD participant
Silent. Ah, the dance . . . Oh . . . it looks like someone following someone else with-
out them noticing. And at the end, he realizes; the other one just runs away. Scores: Inten-
tionality = 4.5, Appropriateness = 3, Length = 3.5.
Music. That’s it. They were dancing, even though they’re triangles.
Scores: Intentionality = 3, Appropriateness = 1, Length = 2.
Participant with ASD
Silent. All right, it looked like one of the triangles was walking along, and then the
blue smaller one comes along, and he’s following the other one and imitating him. The red
one turns around, and the blue one is like “Do do doo,” and that happened several times.
Scores: Intentionality = 4.5, Appropriateness = 3, Length = 5.
Music. The music kind of changes the way it seems. Instead of one trying to annoy
the other, it looks like this dance where they go, and then they turn, and then they do that,
and then one pokes the other by accident when they’re walking and the other turns around
and says “Hey, why’d you do that?” The one that poked him just runs away and says
“bleahh.”
Scores: Intentionality = 3, Appropriateness = 1.5, Length = 5.
These are examples of how the addition of music decreased both the appropriateness
and intentionality scores of ToM animations. The length score of the participant with ASD
did not change in this specific example; though as a group the ASD participants’ length of
description was decreased by the music, as was the TD group’s.
Overall, the most important aspect of the difference between the music and silent
conditions is that both groups were influenced in the same direction on all three of the
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dimensions on which descriptions were scored: length, appropriateness, and intentionality.
Additionally, there was no difference between groups in ratings of how well the music
matched the animations. The only evidence of a group difference was the trend toward
increases rather than decreases in intentionality scores on the random condition for partic-
ipants with Asperger syndrome compared to those with PDD-NOS and TD. The partici-
pants with Asperger syndrome attributed almost no intentionality to the random
animations in the silent condition, but in the music condition the intentionality of their
descriptions was increased, while the other two groups showed the opposite trend.
CONCLUSION
Individuals with ASD are impaired in attributing intentionality to abstract shapes
when the shapes’ interactions appear to be socially complex. This result coincides with
our first hypothesis that deficits in social attribution cannot be influenced by music, at
least in these combinations presented. At the same time, music had no differential effects
on the ASD and TD groups. Music altered appropriateness across all participants and ani-
mation types and decreased intentionality scores of all participants’ responses on the more
socially complex animations. We also found evidence suggesting that there are differences
between subgroups within the autism spectrum in the effect music has on appropriateness
and intentionality of descriptions, but this is preliminary and should be studied further
with larger samples of participants. As measured by the effect that music has on their
social attribution, adolescents with ASD show no deficits in their ability to integrate music
with moving visual displays or their ability to extract meaning from musical excerpts.
Future studies are needed to explore this in greater depth, particularly with respect to sub-
groups within the autism spectrum, but this is evidence that music is indeed a domain of
relatively spared cognition for individuals with ASD.
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APPENDIX A
1. List of music used
2. Pairing of music with animations, organized by animation type (level of social com-
plexity)
APPENDIX B
ANIMATIONS TASK-SCORING PROCEDURES
Scoring verbal descriptions: The verbal descriptions provided by subjects after
each animation are transcribed verbatim and coded in terms of three different dimensions:
Intentionality, Appropriateness, and Length. For intentionality ratings, the highest level
response that is provided within a particular narrative should be rated. For appropriateness
ratings, the overall content of the response is considered in making ratings.
1. Intentionality Score (0 to 5)
The Intentionality score reflects the degree to which the subject describes complex,
intentional mental states. Degree of attribution of mental states to the triangles (agents) is
Artist or Composer Song Title Album
Carl Stalling In Session (1951–1956) The Carl Stalling Project — Music from 
Warner Bros. Cartoons 1936–1958
Carl Stalling Powerhouse and other cuts from 
the early 50s
The Carl Stalling Project — Music from 
Warner Bros. Cartoons 1936–1958
Carl Orff Uf dem Anger — Dance Carmina Burana
Courtney Pine The 37th Chamber Modern Day Jazz Stories
David Grisman Minor Swing Hot Dawg
Duke Ellington Creole Love Call The Essential Duke Ellington
Danny Elfman End Theme The Nightmare Before Christmas
Herb Alpert and the 
Tijuana Brass
Spanish Flea Greatest Hits
John Coltrane Giant Steps Giant Steps
Modest Mussorgsky The Hut on Fowl’s Legs (Baba Yaga) Modest Mussorgsky: Pictures at an Exhibition
Random Goal-Directed Theory of Mind
Animation Music Animation Music Animation Music
Silent Billiard Leading Mocking
Star Fighting Surprise
Dancing Seducing
Music Billiard Giant Steps Leading Creole Love Call Mocking Minor Swing
Star The 37th 
Chamber
Leading Nightmare Before 
Christmas End 
Theme
Mocking Powerhouse and other 
cuts from the early 
50’s
Fighting Spanish Flea Surprise Uf dem Anger - Dance
Dancing The Hut on Fowl’s 
Legs (Baba Yaga)
Seducing In Session (1951–1956)
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calculated by analyzing the content of each narrative provided by the subjects. To mini-
mize the use of subjective interpretations of others’ language use, terminology, idioms,
and so forth, the analysis focuses exclusively on the type of verb that is used to describe the
triangles’ actions. The degree of intentionality reflected in the verb is rated with a numeri-
cal scale that ranges from 0 to 5. Ratings follow an “intentionality ladder,” with scores
moving upwards in accordance with the degree to which the narrative describes purpose-
ful movement, interaction between agents, and attribution of mental states to one or both
agents in the animations.
0 = No purposeful action, no mental state attribution (even if 2 agents are described).
At the bottom of the intentionality ladder, the description does not refer to purpose-
ful movement, interaction between the characters, or attribution of intentionality. Any
movement described is random.
Examples: moving around, floating, bouncing off, spinning, orbiting.
1 = Purposeful action but no interaction between agents, no mental-state attribution.
In the next step up in the ladder, the movement of one or both agents is described as
having a purpose or goal, but there is no interaction between the agents and no attribution
of mental states.
Examples: walking, swimming, running, galloping, jumping.
2 = Purposeful action that involves interaction between agents, but no mental-state
attribution.
In this step, the agents are described as moving in a purposeful, interactive manner
with each other but there is no attribution of mental states.
Examples: fighting; following, chasing, restraining, guarding, pulling, pushing,
wresting, dominating, copying.
3 = Goal-directed intention (i.e., wanting to, trying to) to one agent or an emotion
that does not involve reciprocal interaction between agents.
A further step up, the description contains deliberate action with reference to goal-
directed, intentional states or emotions of only one agent (or separate attributions for each
agent) — mental-state attributions do not occur in the context of reciprocal interaction
between the agents. Both goal-directed intentions and emotions are directly observable in
the agent’s physical motion or physical changes (e.g., sobbing, giggling, shaking in the
case of emotions and repeated movement — failing and trying again — towards a target in
the case of goal-directed intentions).
Examples: wanting to, trying to, is reluctant, is happy, is angry, subject gives one of
the characters a voice (“the little one goes, ‘Hey, I don’t want to do that’”).
4 = Attribution of “transparent” mental states that involve reciprocal interaction
between agents.
This step describes deliberate action with reference to complex mental states and
emotions that are “transparent” and cannot be inferred directly from observing the agent’s
clear physical clues. In the case of emotions, this step describes emotions that occur in the
context of reciprocal interactions (e.g., emotions of one agent are affected by the behavior
of the other agent).
Examples: thinking, being interested, wondering, encouraging, mocking, mimick-
ing, teasing, being friendly with each other, having fun with each other, “the blue one is
annoying the red one.”
5 = One agent intentionally affecting or manipulating the mental state of another
agent.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Le
vi
ti
n,
 D
an
ie
l 
J.
][
Ca
na
di
an
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
Kn
ow
le
dg
e 
Ne
tw
or
k]
 A
t:
 0
6:
31
 1
3 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
MUSIC AND SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION 21
The highest step describes the most complex types of interactions between two
agents on a mental-state level. One agent acts with the goal of affecting, deceiving, or
manipulating the other. The description reflects appreciation of how one agent purposely
uses awareness of other’s mental state to achieve some goal.
Examples: pretending, deceiving, coaxing, surprising, convincing, seducing, trick-
ing, persuading, “the red one probably didn’t want to hurt the blue one’s feelings,” “the
red one is trying to make the blue one feel better,” “the red one is trying to embarrass or
humiliate the blue one.”
2. Appropriateness score (0–3)
The Appropriateness score rates how accurately the participant describes the event
depicted in the animations, as intended by the underlying scripts for each animation that were
developed by the designers of this task. The degree of appropriate description of the animation
is determined by analyzing the description of the agents’ actions, interactions, and mental
states. For example, an appropriate description (score = 3) for the ToM animation in which the
big triangle persuades the little one to go out must convey the idea of little triangle’s reluctance
to go out and big triangle’s attempts to get the little one out — e.g., “persuading” or “coaxing.”
A less appropriate description (score = 2) would focus on one aspect of the story or one char-
acter only — e.g., little one doesn’t want to go out, or, big one is pushing little one to go out.
An inappropriate description (score = 1) concerns actions that do not relate to the events or
relate to a very minor aspect of the sequence only — e.g., “the two triangles didn’t like each
other.” Finally, when the subject does not provide any description, the narrative is scored 0.
General rules:
3 = Spot-on description of the story or the actions represented. It may be concise, just cap-
turing gist, or discursive.
2 = Partial description of the sequence. Description is related to the sequence but is impre-
cise or incomplete.
1 = Descriptions that focus solely on a minor aspect of the sequence.
0 = “Don’t know” answers.
Random movement sequences:
Billiard (animation with no enclosure); Star (animation with enclosure)
3 = Descriptions implying random or purposeless movement including moving about,
bouncing off the walls, or dancing as in dancing lights.
2 = Purposeful movement without interaction, including turning round and getting dizzy,
or dancing in a circle.
1 = Purposeful movement implying interaction between the triangles including copying
each other.
Goal-directed movement sequences:
Fighting: (animation with no enclosure)
3 = Action implying physical fight (e.g., bashing each other).
2 = Action that conveys the idea of a conflict but is either too specific or too vague (e.g.,
biting, pushing).
1 = Action that does not relate to conflict (e.g., following each other) or focuses solely on
a minor aspect of the sequence.
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Leading: (animation with enclosure)
3 = Description that conveys the idea of one leading the other or one following the other.
2 = Description that is related to but somewhat remote from following (e.g., copying,
chasing).
1 = Action that does not relate to following/leading or focuses solely on a minor aspect of
the sequence.
Dancing: (animation with no enclosure)
3 = Description that conveys the idea of moving in formation (e.g., dancing, making a pat-
tern).
2 = Description that is partially correct or related to dancing (e.g., doing different things
— one went one way — the other went the other way).
1 = Action that is not related to dancing (e.g., galloping along or focuses solely on a minor
aspect of the sequence).
Theory of Mind movement sequences:
Surprising: (animation with enclosure)
3 = Any mention of tricking, surprising, hiding, hide and seek.
2 = Description that gives part of the story but misses the critical point (see above).
1 = Description not related to any of the events in the sequence or focuses solely on a
minor part of action (e.g., knocking on the door).
Mocking: (animation with no enclosure)
3 = Description that conveys idea little triangle is copying big one with the intention of not
being noticed (e.g., pretending, hiding, being naughty).
2 = Partially correct description (e.g., following, pursuing, copying).
1 = Description that does not relate to the events (e.g., big triangle not interested) or relates
to a very minor aspect of the sequence only (e.g., little triangle ran away).
Seducing: (animation with enclosure)
3 = Description that conveys the little triangle is trapped in and escapes by persuading,
tricking the big one (e.g., Little convinces in a seductive way to let him out).
2 = Partial story with minimal action for each character (e.g., Little trying to escape).
1 = Description that is too minimal (e.g., she got out, or unrelated to the sequence).
3.  Length Score (0–5) [adapted for use in this study]
0 = no response
1 = one clause
2 = two clauses
3 = three clauses
4 = four clauses
5 = five or more clauses
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